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DYNAMIC MACROECONOMICS: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY
By Hans Brems
Abstract
The paper adds government to a neoclassical growth model. With
government come money, government expenditure, taxes, and the govern-
ment budget constraint. The resulting model is solved for the growth
rates of all its variables. The growth rate of the money supply
never appears in solutions for real variables but always appears in
solutions for nominal ones. The model is also solved for the level
of the real rate of interest. Whether financed by a higher tax rate
or by a more rapidly growing money supply, larger government purchases
will raise the level of the real rate of interest.

DYNAMIC MACROECONOMICS: FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY
By Hans Brems
I. INTRODUCTION
1 . Purpose and Framework
For all its simplicity, Solow's (1956) neoclassical growth model
simulated a century of U.S. economic growth remarkably well. But it
was a model of a purely private economy: no government purchase of
goods, no taxes, and no money supply. The purpose of the present
paper is to add government.
With government comes money, and with money come prices and a
rate of interest. Indeed under inflation come two rates of interest,
a nominal one and a real one, as Turgot [1769-1770 (1922: 75-76)],
Fisher (1896), and Mundell (1971) emphasized. With government come
taxes. Solow never optimized his capital stock. We shall optimize
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it and find inflation, interest, and taxes important for such optimi-
zation, as Feldstein (1976) had found.
With government come crowding-out and inflation—but also the
fiscal-policy and monetary-policy instruments needed to control them.
Policy conclusions may be drawn, and we shall drawn them.
We shall use the following notation.
2. Variables
C = physical consumption
D = desired holding of money
G = physical government purchase of goods
g h proportionate rate of growth
I = physical investment
k = present gross worth of another physical unit of capital stock
< = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L = labor employed
n = present net worth of another physical unit of capital stock
P = price of good
R = tax revenue
r = before-tax nominal rate of interest
p = aftertax real rate of interest
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S = physical capital stock
w = money wage rate
X = physical output
Y = money national income
y = money disposable income
3. Parameters
a = multiplicative factor of production function
a,
8
= exponents of a production function
c = propensity to consume
F = available labor force
X = proportion employed of available labor force
M = supply of money
m = multiplicative factor of deraand-f or-money function
U = exponent of demand-f or-money function
T = tax rate
The model will include derivatives with respect to time; hence it
is dynamic. All parameters are stationary except a, F, and M, whose
growth rates are stationary.
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II. THE MODEL
Define the proportionate rate of growth of variable v as
dv 1
dt v
g„ 5 - (o
Define investment as
I = gg
S (2)
Let an aggregate production function be of Cobb-Douglas form:
X = aL
a
S
8
(3)
where < a < 1; < B < 1; a + B 1; and a > 0.
Let purely competitive entrepreneurs maximize their profits with
respect to labor employed. Let profits be taxed at the rate T.
Before-tax profits equal market value of output minus labor cost
minus capital cost, and aftertax profits equal the constant 1 - T
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times before-tax profits. Before-tax and aftertax profits are maxi-
mized, then, at the same labor employed L, i.e., where the real wage
rate equals the physical marginal productivity of labor:
w 3X X
- = a - (4)
P 9L L
Rearrange (4) and write the neoclassical mark-up-pricing equation
wL
P = — (5)
ctX
saying that neoclassical price P equals per-unit labor cost wL/X
marked up in the proportion 1/a.
Define physical marginal productivity of capital stock as
3X X
< =
3S
= 8
S
(6)
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Profits were taxed at the rate T. At time t, then, aftertax
marginal value productivity of capital stock is (1 - T)<(t)P(t).
Let there be a market in which money may be placed or borrowed at
the stationary nominal rate of interest r. Let nominal interest earn-
ings be taxed and nominal interest expense be tax-deductible at the
rate T. Then money may be placed or borrowed at the aftertax rate
(1 - T)r. Let that rate be applied when discounting future cash
flows. As seen from the present time t, then, aftertax marginal value
productivity of capital stock is (1 - T)<(t)P(t)e .
Define present gross worth of another physical unit of capital stock
as the present worth of all future aftertax marginal value productivi-
ties over its entire useful life. Let capital stock be immortal:
u •* «•. Then
k(t) = / (1 - T)<(t)P(t)e~°
T)r(t T)
dt (7)
Let entrepreneurs expect physical marginal productivity of capital
stock to be growing at the stationary rate g :
< n /a g < (t " T)<(t) = <(t)e
and price of output to be growing at the stationary rate gp
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g„(t - t)
P(t) = P(r)e p
Insert these into (7), define
p = (1 - T)r - ( g< + gp ) (8)
and write the integral (7) as
00
k(x) - / (1 - T)<(T)P(x)e"
p(t
"
T)
dt '
T
Neither (1 - T), <(t), nor P(t) is a function of t; hence they
may be taken outside the integral sign. Our g , gp , and r were all
said to be stationary; hence the coefficient p of t is stationary,
too. Assume p > 0. As a result find the integral to be
k = (1 - T)<P/p (9)
Find present net worth of another physical unit of capital stock
as its gross worth minus its price:
n = k - P = [(1 - T)</p - 1]P
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Desired capital stock is the size of stock for which the present
net worth of another physical unit of capital stock equals zero, or
(1 - T)< = p (10)
Finally take equations (6) and (10) together and find desired
capital stock
S = (1 - T)BX/p (11)
In accordance with the definition (2) take the growth rate of
desired capital stock (11) and write desired investment
I = gg
S - (1 - T)Sg
s
X/p (12)
If we think of (11) and (12) as being derived for an individual
entrepreneur, then everything except X on their right-hand sides is
common to all entrepreneurs. Factor out all common factors, sum over
all entrepreneurs, then X becomes national physical output, and (11)
and (12) become national desired capital stock and investment, re-
spectively.
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For all their attention to crowding-out, monetarists have shown
little interest in deriving investment functions like (12). But let
us take a closer look at (11) and (12) just the same. Both are in
inverse proportion to p. What is p? In the definition (8) of p, let
it be correctly foreseen that g = —our steady-state growth and
inflation model will indeed have the solution (27), and historically
the physical marginal productivity < has displayed no secular trend.
In that case p collapses into the aftertax real rate of interest
(1 " T)r - gp .
In the special case of taxation but no inflation, g = 0, (10)
will collapse into the familiar Keynesian case < = r. In the special
case of inflation but no taxation, T = 0, (10) will collapse into the
familiar Fisherian case < = p = r - g . But with both inflation and
taxation present, nothing less than (10) will do.
Capital stock was assumed to be immortal, so we may ignore capital
consumption allowances and define national income as the market value
of physical output
Y = PX (13)
Let all such national income be distributed to persons and be
taxed once and at the rate T. Then tax revenue is
-10-
R = TY (14)
where < T < 1.
Define disposable income as national income minus tax revenue:
y = Y - R (15)
Let consumption be the fraction c of disposable real income:
C = cy/P (16)
where < c < 1.
Let government finance its deficit, if any, by increasing the
money supply. The government budget constraint is then
GP - R = gMM (17)M
Let labor employed be the proportion X of available labor force
L = XF (18)
where < X < 1 is the "natural" rate of employment.
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Let the demand for money be a function of money national income
and of the aftertax nominal rate of interest:
D = mY[(l - T)r] U (19)
where u < and m > 0.
Goods-market equilibrium requires the supply of goods to equal the
demand for them:
X = C + I + G (20)
Money-market equilibrium requires the supply of money to equal
the demand for it:
M = D (21)
We may now proceed to solving the system for the growth rates of
its variables and for the level of its aftertax real rate of interest.
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III. SOLUTIONS
1 . Growth-Rate Solutions
Consider our natural rate X a stationary parameter, insert (18)
into (3), take growth rates, and find
gx
- g
a
+ ag
F
+ 6g
s
(22)
Insert (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and the definitional part of
(12) into (20), rearrange, and find the rate of growth of physical
capital stock
gg
= [(1 - c)(l - T) - gMM/Y]X/S (23)
For the following reasons the square bracket of (23) is station-
ary. First, the growth rate e of the money supply was said to be
stationary. According to (19) and (21) M/Y = m[(l - T)r] U . Second,
all parameters c, m, u, and T were said to be stationary. Third,
the nominal rate of interest r was assumed to be stationary.
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Consequently the growth rate of the growth rate (23), i.e., the rate
of acceleration of physical capital stock is simply
ggS gX gS
Insert (22) and write the rate of acceleration as
g gS
- a(g
a
/a + gp - g s ) (24)
In (24) there are three possibilities: if g > g /a + g thenb a F
ggs
< 0. If
g
s
- g
a
/c + gF (25)
then g = 0. Finally, if g < g /a + g , then g > 0. Conse-gb b a r gb
quently, if greater than (25) g is falling; if equal to (25) g is
stationary; and if less than (25) g,, is rising. Furthermore, g_
cannot alternate around (25), for differential equations trace con-
tinuous time paths, and as soon as a g<,-path touched (25) it would
have to stay there. Finally, g„ cannot converge to anything else
than (25), for if it did, by letting enough time elapse we could make
the left-hand side of (24) smaller than any arbitrarily assignable
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positive constant e, however small, without the same being possible
for the right-hand side. We conclude that g must either equal
g /a + g from the outset or, if it does not, converge to that value.
a F
Once such convergence has been established we may easily find the
corresponding values of other growth rates: insert (25) into (22),
recall that a + 8 = 1, and find the long-run growth rate of physical
output
gx
= g
s
(26)
Take the growth rate of (6), insert (26), and find
g< = (27)
By taking growth rates of the entire system (1) through (21) the
reader may convince himself that it is satisfied by (25), (26), and
(27) as well as the following solutions
g
c
- g
x
(28)
gD
- gM
(29)
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gG
- g
x
(30)
h - h (31)
gL
= gF
(32)
&M
= gY
(33)
gR
= gY
(3A)
g
r
= (35)
g
p
= (36)
g
w/p - g a /a (37)
gY
= gp
+ g
x
(38)
g
y
- gY
(39)
Our growth was steady-state growth because no right-hand side of
our solutions (25) through (39) was a function of time.
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2. Properties of Growth-Rate Solutions: Inflation Control
Our growth-rate solutions deliver Friedman's (1968) conclusions.
First, no growth-rate solution for the nine real variables C, G, I, k,
L, p, S, w/P, and X has the rate of growth g^^ of the money supply in
it, directly or indirectly. Second, the growth-rate solutions for the
five nominal variables D, P, R, Y, and y have the rate of growth gv^
of the money supply in them, directly or indirectly. Specifically,
the rate of growth g^^ of the money supply may be thought of as a
policy instrument used to control inflation: take the growth-rate
solutions (33) and (38) together, insert (25) and (26), and find
gp
" gM
" Cg
a
/o + gF ) (40)
or, in English, knowing the rate of technological progress g and the
rate of growth of the labor force g_ and knowing the elasticity a of
r
physical output with respect to labor, the monetary authorities may
control the rate of inflation g by controlling the rate of growth
g of the money supply.
3. The Aftertax Real Rate of Interest: Crowding-Out
Use (11) to express p as ( 1 - T)8X/S, insert (23), and find
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6g
sp- 2 (41)
1 - c - gM
(M/Y)/(l - T)
A larger government purchase G may be financed either by a higher
tax rate T or by a more rapidly growing money supply allowing, accord-
ing to (17), a larger deficit at an unchanged tax rate. So either T
or g,_^ is up. Whether T or g is up, the effect upon the aftertax real
rate of interest (41) is the same: the last, negative, terra of the
denominator of (41) is up, either because its denominator 1 - T is
down or because its numerator gMM/Y is up. Either way (41) is up.
The higher aftertax real rate of interest (41) will discourage
investment (12). In other words there will be crowding out. We learn
from (41) that crowding-out will result not only from a larger deficit
but also from a higher tax rate.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Monetarists wish to include the rate of inflation among their
equilibrating variables. Any model admitting inflation as an
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equilibrating variable will contain a derivative with respect to time,
hence will be dynamic, and will contain two additional equilibrating
variables—the nominal and the real rate of interest. Consequently,
a monetarist model must be a dynamic two-interest-rates model.
According to Friedman, monetary policy cannot peg the rate of unemploy-
ment for more than very limited periods. Consequently, a monetarist
model must dismiss and go beyond such limited periods and become a
long-run model.
A long-run, dynamic, two-interest-rates model is obviously incom-
patible with the short-run, static, one-interest-rate IS-LM framework
offered by Friedman (1970) himself as his "theoretical framework." As
Thygesen (1977) observed in his Nobel article, Friedman "is clearly
uncomfortable with it." He should be!
By contrast we found a neoclassical steady-state growth model
capable of delivering most of Friedman's conclusions. His growth-rate
conclusions were delivered impeccably. No growth-rate solution for a
real variable included the rate of growth of the money supply. All
growth-rate solutions for nominal variables included the rate of
growth of the money supply. His growth-level conclusions—that money
shouldn't matter for the level of real variables
—
did not hold for the
level of the aftertax real rate of interest: it was up if gM was up.
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But in fact monetarists agree. In our model money came into
existence by financing a budget deficit, and monetarists agree that
such deficits produce crowding-out—indeed monetarists gave us the
crowding-out concept. And how can crowding-out occur except via a
higher aftertax real rate of interest?
-20-
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